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Domo arigato, Mr. Roboto, Mata ah-oo hima de.
Domo arigato, Mr. Roboto, Himitsu wo shiri tai.
The problem's plain to see: too much technology
Machines to save our lives. Machines dehumanize.

INTRODUCTION

John Henry, a research chemist at the C & 0 Chemical Co., makes new
chemical compounds the old-fashioned way: one at a time, thoroughly isolating,
identifying and testing each new compound. 2 He discovers a new anti-viral
compound that cures both AIDS and the West Nile virus and subsequently applies
3
for a patent. His application is rejected by the Patent Office as being anticipated by
and obvious over 4 a patent assigned to the Steam Drill Chemical Co. The Steam
Drill patent has three broad claims:
1. A library 5 comprising a plurality of compounds of Formula 1:
XYZ;
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1 STYX, Mr. Roboto, on KILROY WAS HERE (A & M Records 1983). Rough English translation of
the Japanese: Thank you very much, Mr. Roboto, until we meet again. Thank you very much, Mr.
Roboto, I want to know your secret. Id.
2 IRWIN SHAPIRO, JOHN HENRY AND THE DOUBLE-JOINTED STEAM DRILL (1945).
This
hypothetical is loosely based on the American legend of John Henry as related by Irwin Shapiro. -,d.
3 The statutory requirement for novelty entitles a person "to a patent unless . . . the invention
was . . . patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent ..
" 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
The statutory requirement of nonobviousness mandates:
[a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time of the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
5 The term "library" as used herein refers to a collection of compounds, typically produced
either as discrete compounds or as mixtures of compounds. See U.S. Patent No. 6,255,120 (issued
July 3, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,037,340 (issued Mar. 14, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 5,874,443 (issued
Feb. 23, 1999).
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wherein X is a scaffold 6 and Y and Z are Markush7 groups comprising
hundreds of substituents.
2. A compound s of the Formula 1:
XYZ;
wherein X is a scaffold and Y and Z are Markush groups comprising
hundreds of substituents.
3. A method of making the library or compounds of claims 1 or 2
comprising the step of converting scaffold X to a further functionalized
compound XYZ.9
This patent essentially claims millions of compounds and discloses an automated
method to make these compounds. Although the patent provides some experimental
data on thousands of these compounds, John Henry's compound was neither
characterized or tested for a particular utility. 10
The Patent Office awarded the patent to Steam Drill in order to stimulate
11
technological progress in the pioneering area of "combinatorial chemistry."
The
6 The term "scaffold" as used herein refers to a structural part of a compound that allows it to
be easily derivatized with diverse substituents; for example, to result in compounds with diverse
topologies. See U.S. Patent No. 6,448,443 (issued Sept. 10, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 6,403,312 (issued
June 11, 2002).
7 Ex parte Markush, 1925 C.D. 126 (Comm'r Pat. 1925); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (hereinafter "MPEP") § 2173.05(h) (8th ed. 2001). Chemical compounds
and libraries are commonly claimed by using either the compound's official International Union of
Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) name or the compound's chemical structure, often in generic,
Markush form. Id. A Markush claim is a claim that creates an artificial group and recites members
of that group as being "selected from the group consisting of." Id. A Markus-h claim is used when
there is no single generic term available to describe all of what an applicant's invention includes. Id.
8 The term "compound" is used herein in the traditional sense, referring to chemical material
that has sufficient spectral or other structural data to allow for the identification of the same
compound by another practitioner. This is sometimes referred to as "characterizing" the compound.
The term "compound" as used herein is different than a mere "library member," which is any
uncharacterized, physical product of the method to make the library. While "compounds" and
"library members" are clearly differentiated in the academic chemical literature, patents often use
these two terms interchangeably. Preparation of Manuscripts, J. COMBINATORIAL CHEM., 4,12A,
13A (2002), available at http://pubs.acs.org/instruct/cchff.pdf [hereinafter Manuscripts]. In
addition, patent claims sometimes only refer to the part of the compound necessary for a particular
use or function; for example, a structural feature that is associated with a particular advantage.
Other parts of the compound are not particularly specified in the patent claim to leave room for
further investigation and optimization. See U.S. Patent No. 5,648,458 (issued July 15, 1997).
9 Examples of specialized reaction protocols, schemes, and reagents directed to combinatorial
chemical libraries are disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 5,632,898 (issued May 27, 1997); U.S. Patent No.
5,670,480 (issued Sept. 23, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,605,616 (issued Feb. 25, 1997). Chemical,
analytical, mathematical, or practical approaches to creating, manipulating, or assessing libraries or
arrays are disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 5,670,054 (issued Sept. 23, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,604,097
(issued Feb. 18, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,573,905 (issued Nov. 12, 1996). Other combinatorial
chemical methodology is disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 5,677,195 (issued Oct. 14, 1997); U.S. Patent
No. 5,663,046 (issued Sept. 2, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,651,943 (issued July 29, 1997).
10The term "characterized" as used herein refers to a compound that was purified, isolated,
and definitively identified by spectroscopic or other means.
Manuscrpts, supra note 8, at
http://pubs.acs.org/instruct/cchff.pdf.
11The term "combinatorial chemistry" as used herein refers to automated or semi-automated
methods to synthesize, in parallel, more than one chemical compound. See generally Nicholas K.

Terret et al., CombinatorialSynthesis - The Design of Compound Libraries and their Application to
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Patent system attempts to balance putting the public in possession of the invention
with awarding a temporary monopoly on new libraries, compounds, and methods
claimed by inventors, such as those of Steam Drill. 12 The public is deemed in
possession of an invention if the inventors' disclosure enables one of ordinary skill in
the art, in this case an ordinary chemist, to practice the invention. 13 This disclosure
then prevents future patents, such as one for John Henry's invention, from being
issued, as they will now be deemed anticipated by the patent or obvious to those of
14
ordinary skill in the art.
This concept of enablement is the principal doctrine speaking to the
sufficiency of an inventor's disclosure to receive a patent.1 5 In rapidly developing arts
such as combinatorial chemistry, where patentees seek the broadest possible patent
claim scope, other researchers and patent practitioners, the Patent Office, and the
courts 16 often struggle to correlate the scope of the enabling disclosure with the scope
of the claims. 17 The emergence of specialized doctrines, such as the doctrine of
Drug Discovery, 51 TETRAHEDRON 8135 (1995) (giving an overview of combinatorial chemical
approaches); Jonathan A. Ellman, Design, Synthesis, and Evaluation of Small-Molecule Libraries,
29 ACe. CHEM. RES. 132 (1996) (describing how small-molecule libraries are made and analyzed);
Sheila Hobbs-DeWitt & Anthony W. Czarnik, CombinatorialOrganic Synthesis Using Parke-Davis's
DIVERSOMER Method, 29 ACe. CHEM. RES. 114 (1996) (describing a particular combinatorial
organic synthesis methodology); Lorin A. Thompson and J. A. Ellman, Synthesis andApplications of
Small Molecule Libraries, 96 CHEM. REV. 555 (1996) (providing an overview of synthetic methods
and uses of small molecule libraries); E. M. Gordon et. al., Strategy and Tactics in Combinaturial
Organic Synthesis: Applications to Drug Discovery, 29 ACC. CHEM. RES. 144 (1996) (giving several
examples of how combinatorial chemistry is being used in the pharmaceutical industry).
12 Soe genorally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Seioneo: Exelusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (discussing the "incentive to disclose" theory
and other explanatory theories of patent systems). Courts frequently characterize the patentee's
disclosure as the "consideration" for this contract with the public for the monopolistic patent grant.
[An inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In
consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the
patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years,
but, upon the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to
the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its
use. To this end the law requires such disclosure to be made in the application for
patent that others skilled in the art may understand the invention and how to put
it to use.

United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) (citation omitted). See also
Timothy J. Douros, Lending the Federal Circuit a Hand: An Economic Interpretation of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 321, 325 (1995) (discussing the goals of the American
patent system).
1:3Under current United States law, enablement requires that "[t]he specification shall contain
... the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same.. ." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
14See supra,text accompanying notes 3 and 4.
15 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
16 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the patentee, and the patentee's
representatives consider enablement during prosecution of the patent application before the USPTO
to determine if it should issue. See MPEP, supra note 7, at § 2164. Other researchers, patent
practitioners and the courts consider enablement when assessing the validity of issued patent
claims. See generally4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 7.03[4] (2000).
17 For example, the Federal Circuit recently summarized the relationship between the public
interest, enablement, and the scope of the claims as follows:
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reasonable experimentation, complicates this task by allowing courts to supplement a
patents literal disclosure with "what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the
art without undue experimentation"18 for reasons of equity. 19 All of these concepts
20
are further taxed now that experimentation is easily automated.
This Comment addresses whether the present formulation of the reasonable
experimentation doctrine in the United States is appropriate in light of the use of
automated experimental techniques, particularly in the area of combinatorial
chemical synthesis and assessment of the resulting products. This Comment also
further examines how this technology affects the policies of the patent system in
encouraging the development and protection of important new products while
maintaining appropriate disclosure requirements.
Part l.A explains the nature of automated experimental techniques by
comparing traditional chemical synthesis with an example of combinatorial chemical
synthesis. Part I.B addresses the establishment and acceptance of the reasonable
experimentation doctrine by the United States' courts. Part II points out the
problems in patent interpretation using the factors that determine reasonable
experimentation pursuant to In re Wands. In Parts III and IV.A, this Comment
justifies modifying and narrowing the reasonable experimentation doctrine. Finally,
in Part IV.B, it proposes more stringent disclosure and claiming requirements, such
as product-by-process claiming, that would more accurately reflect the scope of
enablement.

[t]he enablement requirement of § 112 demands that the patent specification
enable "those skilled in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed
invention without 'undue experimentation."'
The enablement requirement
ensures that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a
degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims. The scope of the
claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement. The scope of
enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope
of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue
experimentation.
Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
18Id.

19In addition to the doctrine of reasonable experimentation, the doctrine of equivalents has
also been a point of controversy for this same conflict between the policy of issuing patents to give
notice to the public while simultaneously fairly protecting the inventor from routine copyists. The
doctrine of equivalents affords the patentee changes from the literal interpretation which the court
deems as "insubstantial." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 122 S. Ct.

1831 (2002).
20

Terret, supra note 11, at 8137-69.
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I. AUTOMATED EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUES AND THE REASONABLE EXPERIMENTATION
DOCTRINE

A. Traditional Versus Automated Approaehes to Chemical Compound Synthesis
It is first necessary to understand the technology of automated
experimentation to realize its impact on the doctrine of reasonable experimentation.
As an illustration of automated experimentation, this Comment will compare how
traditional chemical synthetic methods and combinatorial chemical methods make
and test new chemical compounds.
In the traditional method of discovering a novel chemical compound, the goal
21
of the inventor is directed primarily toward the synthesis of a single compound.
The inventor takes a known compound and modifies part of the structure of this
starting compound using reaction conditions that have successfully transformed
similar parts of other compounds to the desired motif.22 To achieve this, the inventor
conducts an experiment that involves: (1) combining the starting compound with the
known reagent in solution in a single reaction vessel; (2) neutralizing or
concentrating the reaction mixture; and (3) performing appropriate isolation
techniques 23 to obtain the single new compound. 24 To prove that the new compound
has in fact been made, the inventor must identify the compound, typically using
spectroscopic techniques such as 1H or 13C nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR),
infrared (IR), and high-resolution mass spectroscopy (HRMS).25
To establish
patentability, the inventor must establish some utility for the compound. 26 Such
synthetic and analytical activities are labor-intensive, and an average chemist can
perhaps make at most a few hundred compounds per year by this method. 27 By
contrast, in order to develop a new commercial compound, usually thousands of
compounds have to be prepared and tested. 28 This time-consuming approach has

21

Jd. at 8138.

22

See generally ROYSTON M. ROBERTS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN EXPERIMENTAL

ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 101-431 (2d ed. 1974).
23 See gonerallyJAMES W. ZUBRICK, ORGANIC CHEM LAB SURVIVAL MANUAL 117-360 (3d ed.

1992).
Examples of appropriate isolation techniques include, but are not limited
recrystallization, extraction or washing, distillation, sublimation, or chromatography. Id.
24

to,

Jd

25FRANCIS A. CAREY, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 512-49 (3d ed. 1996). For the most part, present
day structure determination techniques are spectroscopic in nature. Id. All of these techniques
identify the compound based on how the compound responds while in the presence of various energy
sources. Id. NMR examines what happens to a compound when it is bombarded with radio
frequencies of light in the presence of a magnetic field, IR examines what happens to a compound
when it is bombarded with infrared light, and HRMS examines what happens to a compound when
it is bombarded with electrons. Id.
26 In order to be patentable, a claimed invention also must be useful. This requirement of
utility is codified as, "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
27See generallyTerret,supra note 11.
28 Id.
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resulted ever increasing research and development costs which typically are passed
29
on to the consumer.
The need to improve the speed and reduce the cost by which new compounds
are created, coupled with advances in robotics, have made possible the process or
strategy which is commonly referred to as combinatorial chemistry. 30 Combinatorial
chemistry uses automated machinery so that large numbers of chemical experiments
are conducted simultaneously. 31 For example, if coupling starting material A with
reagent B gives the new compound A-B, combinatorial synthesis can take a range of
similar starting materials A1-An (where Al, A2, A 3 . . . are different starting
materials), sometimes referred to as "scaffolds," and react those with a single reagent
Bi or a range of reagents Bi-Bn (where Bi, B2, B3 . . . are different reagents) to make
numerous novel compound combinations in only slightly more time as it used to take
to make one compound. These methods have the potential to simultaneously produce
large collections of new compounds collectively referred to and claimed as
32
"libraries."
The research and commercial goal of these activities is to find a "lead
compound," a new compound with a particular utility, such as a pharmaceutical
application. To accomplish this, the "libraries" of new compounds thus obtained are
typically screened for potential utility before they are fully characterized. Screening
experiments are also conducted in an automated, high-throughput format. 33 A few of
the most useful compounds are even partially characterized. 34 Because these
processes are automated, such activities allow for the synthesis, purification,
35
characterization, and testing of hundreds of thousands of compounds per year.
Analogous automated experimental techniques are also used in the field of
biotechnology. 36 Recent patents claim not only the chemical compounds themselves,
but also "libraries" 37 as new compositions of matter as well as the methods used to
38
create, manipulate, and test such compositions of matter.
A patent can claim thousands to millions of compounds or other compositions
of matter thought makeable and useful via these techniques. 39 A problem can arise,
29 Id.
30 JTd
'31Id.
32 See

supra,text accompanying note 5.
33See Terret, supra note 11.
'1 See generally Manuscripts, supra note 8, at http://pubs.acs.org/instruct/cchff.pdf (setting

forth the requirements for publication of a manuscript containing partially characterized
compounds).
'35

36

See Terret, supra note 11.

Analogous automated experimental techniques in the field of biotechnology include: (1)

oligonucleotide and peptide synthesis (a semi-automated process that can sequentially synthesize
these biopolymers in any monomer sequence with very large molecular weights); (2) polymerase

chain reaction (PCR) technology (a semi-automated process that selectively and exponentially
multiplies a specific region of DNA, producing quantities of DNA sufficient for experimentation and
analysis); and (3) sequencing by hybridization (SBH) technology (a semi-automated gene sequencing
process that uses known complementary nucleic acid "probe" compounds to find the corresponding
sequence in an unsequenced genetic fragment). See gonerally FREDERICK M. AUSUBEL, CURRENT
PROTOCOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY, Vol. 1-4 (1999).
See supra text accompanying note 5.
supra text accompanying note 9.
319See supra text accompanying notes 5, 6, and 8.
37

38 See

[2:116 2002]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

however, when only a small percentage of the members of a large library have
explicit experimental support in a patent. To determine whether such a patent
disclosure satisfies the enablement requirement in the chemical arts, a researcher,
patent examiner, judge, or jury40 must look to the disclosure to see if it enables "those
skilled in the art" to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without
unreasonable experimentation. 41 As will be seen in the next sections, this is not
easily determined.

B. The Common Law Evolution of a Broad 'Reasonable"ExperimentationDoctrine
in the United States
There is nothing in the Patent Act that mentions the doctrine of reasonable
experimentation. 42 The reasonable experimentation doctrine arises purely from
caselaw 43 rather than statute. 44 Since 1916, United States patent jurisprudence has
recognized the concept of an exception from literal deficiencies or insufficiencies in
individual disclosures by allowing for some experimentation outside of the disclosure
as long as it is not unduly 45 excessive. 46 This Section focuses on what the current
common-law definition of reasonable experimentation encompasses.
In Mineral Separation v. Hyde, the Supreme Court departed from earlier
47
decisions by establishing that the 35 U.S.C. § 112 enablement requirement is still
satisfied where a specification "is clearly sufficiently definite to guide those skilled in
40 If the issue of enablement is litigated, enablement is ultimately a question of law; however,
there may be underlying factual issues involved. For examples of such underlying factual issues
impacting enablement, see Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1268 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
41See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 7.03[4].
42 See generally35 U.S.C. (1952). The Patent Act of 1952 was a comprehensive effort to restate
and codify patent law to that date. Despite numerous federal trial and appellate courts recognizing
the existence of a reasonable experimentation doctrine, the commentary by a co-author of the 1952
codification of the Act does not even mention reasonable experimentation in the context of § 112. P.
J.Federico, Commnntary on the Now Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1954), reprintedin 75 J.PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 161, 215 (1993) (stating that 35 U.S.C. § 112 i"would include the defenses
such as that the patented invention has not been made, used or sold by the defendant; license; and
equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands" but nothing concerning reasonable
experimentation).
43This concept was explicitly refuted in earlier opinions exemplified by Chief Justice Taney in
Wood v. Underhil, 46 U.S. 1, 5 (1847). In discussing the issue, Chief Justice Taney stated,
[t]he degree of certainty which the law requires is set forth in the act of Congress.
The specification must be in such full, clear, and exact terms as to enable any one
skilled in the art to which it appertains to compound and use the invention; that
is to say, to compound and use it without making anyexperiments of his own.
Id. The concept of reasonable experimentation originated in the opinion of Justice Clarke in Mineral
Separation v.Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916), which courts gradually grew to accept.
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 (1994).
45The terms "undue" and "unreasonable" are used interchangeably in United States case law
and literature describing disclosures that require further experimentation. Compare Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212-13 (Fed. Cir. 1991) with Chemcast Corp. v. Arco
Indus. Corp., 854 F.2d 1328, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
46CHISUM,supra note 16, at 7.03[4].
47See supra text accompanying note 13.
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the art to its successful application" even "while leaving something to the skill of
persons applying the invention." 48 Several explanations have been posited for Justice
Clarke's expansive view. Some believe that there cannot be an effective patent
system if a burden of literal disclosure is placed on the applicant for broad claims,
especially for "pioneering" inventions. 49 To restrict patentees to what is literally
disclosed would be a poor way to stimulate invention and encourage early disclosure
because it would allow copyists to routinely design around patents. 50 Such a policy
was considered both shortsighted and unsound from the standpoint of promoting
51
progress in the useful arts, the Constitutional purpose of the patent laws.
In the years following Mineral Separation, a number of federal trial and
appellate courts recognized the existence of a reasonable experimentation doctrine,52
which was qualitatively applied both in favor 53 as well as against 54 a patentee's
disclosure. To add supplemental structure to this analysis, modern decisions have
expanded the analysis to include more factual considerations than were previously
assessed. A key case addressing the undue experimentation doctrine in the modern
era is In re Wands,55 which has attracted significant scholarly commentary. 56 The

48

Mineral Separation, 242 U.S. at 271. In Mineral Separation, the Court allowed for some

variation of treatment as long as (1) it is within the scope of the claims, and (2) held that the
certainty which the law requires in patents is "not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their
subject matter." Id. at 271. Justice Clarke's dichotomy was adopted in subsequent decisions, and it
remains part of the rule today. See In re Wands 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
49 In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
,o Id.
51 The U.S. Constitution enables Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52 See Lever Bros. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 139 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1943) (stating
that "it is both impracticable and unreasonable to require [the patentee] to set out an extended list
of precise combinations and formulae with specific designation of the exact characteristics
[obtained]"); Franc-Stohmenger & Cowan, Inc. v. Arthur Siegman, Inc., 27 F.2d 785, 786-87 (2d Cir.
1928) (stating that it is not fatal if the disclosure is in terms of performance and result, or if "that an
inventor must exercise independent choice . . . provided it gives the person of ordinary skill in the
art an adequate or sufficient guide").
53 See Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F. 2d 993, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that applicant's claims to
scroll compressors were not unpredictable and nonenabled even though evidence showed the failure
of a prototype with external pivot compressors); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I.DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
750 F.2d 1576, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that a patent's claims to thousands of emulsions, some
of which were prophetic or inoperative, were still enabled unless the number of inoperative
combinations became significant); Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 808 F.2d
1490, 1495-96 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (relying on expert testimony that a patent taught a person of
ordinary skill in the art how to inspect turbine rotors, detect discontinuities, and correlate and
combine this information even though that information was not compiled in the patent); Precision
Metal Fabricators Inc. v. Jetstream Systems Co., 693 F. Supp. 820, 814 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding
that a patent was enabled despite its failure to disclose any depiction or description of a claimed
feature in the patent).
51 See Hormone Research Foundation v. Genentech Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(finding that just because purer and more potent forms of a compound were later produced did not
mean that the patent specification did not provide an enabling disclosure as of the filing date of the
application); Chemeast Corp., 854 F.2d at 1328 (concluding that a determination that the
specification meets the particularity requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 may not support a
determination that a claim meets the enabling requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 2).
55 Wands, 858 F.2d 731.
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Wands factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require
undue experimentation include: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary; (2)
the amount of direction or guidance presented; (3) the presence or absence of working
examples; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the state of the prior art; (6) the relative
skill of those in the art; (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art; and (8)
the breadth of the claims. 57 As the next section will discuss, the interrelationship
among these factors is complex and sometimes ambiguous. 58
The emergence of

automated experimentation further contributes to the difficulty in interpreting and
applying the doctrine.

56 See Robert A. Hodges, Black Box Biotech Inventions: When a 'Mere Wish or Plan"Should Be
Considered an Adequate Description of the Invention, 17 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 831 (2001) (noting that
unpredictability should be deemed on a case by case basis); Matthew D. Kellam, Making Sense out
of Antisense: The Enablement Requirement in Biotechnology After Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 76
IND. L.J. 221 (2001) (arguing that unpredictability, complexity, and broadness of an invention
increases the need for examples); Margaret Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablementand Written
Description Requirements Under 35 US.C 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1233 (2000) (stating that one Wands factor, the predictability of the art at issue, is particularly
important for determining the scope of enablement); Alison E. Cantor, Using the Written
Description and Enablement Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J. LAW AND
TEC 267 (2000) (remarking that the unpredictability of biotechnology is one of the primary factors
that courts use in determining whether undue experimentation would be required in order to
practice the invention); Emanuel Vacchiano, It A Wonderful Genome: The Written-Description
Requirement Protects The Human Genome From Overly-Broad Patents, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
805 (1999) (noting that even in an unpredictable arts applicants do not have to disclose every species
encompassed by their claims); Hugh McTavish, EnablingGenus Patent Claims to DNA, 2001 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 2 (2001) (explaining that the enablement requirement is stricter for
unpredictable arts than predictable ones); Brian P. O'Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genus-*
Developing a New Approach for Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure Within the
UnpredietableArts, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147 (1996) (stating that a method
of making a compound appears to implicitly satisfy the enablement requirement); Stephen G.
Whiteside, Patents Claiming Genetically Engineered Inventions: A Few Thoughts on Obtaining
Broad Propnrty Rights, 30 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1019 (1996) (remarking that the Wands factors are
often a difficult standard to meet when the invention comprises biological materials that are difficult
to reproduce, such as certain cell strains).
o7 Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-37. The factors were first expressed in In re Colianni,561 F.2d 220,
224 (C.C.P.A. 1977) and subsequently used in Ex Parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546 (B.P.A.I.
1986) and Wands.
5s SoeAmgon, 927 F.2d at 1212-14 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that it was not even necessary that
a court review all the Wands factors to find a disclosure enabling). In fact, the court seemed to
ignore a complete Wands factor analysis for several years in its discussion of enablement. See In re
Wright, 999 F. 2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (determining that specification was nonenabling
without undue experimentation referred only to the state of art at time of patent application relative
to the breadth of the claims); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050-52, (Fed. Cir. 1993) (determining
that specification was nonenabling without undue experimentation referred to the number of
working examples and sufficient information, person of ordinary skill, and the scope of claims);
Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1365 (determining that specification was nonenabling without undue
experimentation referred to the number of working examples, level of skill in the art, and the scope
of claims). However, the Federal Circuit returned to its use of the Wands factors in its decision in
Enzo Bioehom Inc. v. Calgeno Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in which all of the Wands
factors were used in determining that two patent specifications were nonenabling without undue
experimentation, while another patent specification was enabling without undue experimentation.
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II. THE WANDS FACTOR ANALYSIS

This Section analyzes how courts would determine whether a patent claim to
a library or to a class of compounds satisfies the enablement requirement under the
Wands factor analysis of "reasonable" experimentation. This Section defines the
issue by analyzing how one would interpret Steam Drill's patent claims and their
accompanying disclosure under the Wands factor analysis.
As mentioned previously, a typical combinatorial chemistry patent claims
thousands to millions of compounds. Many of these compounds will be minimally
characterized, uncharacterized, or illustrated only with an exemplifying procedure in
which the compound might be made.5 9 The issue, therefore, becomes whether the
disclosure enables one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the
claims. To determine whether a patent disclosure in the chemical arts satisfies the
enablement requirement, a chemical researcher, patent examiner, judge, or jury
must weigh at least some of the eight Wands factors. The eight factors are
complicated to apply. Ultimately, the factor of predictability becomes the primary
factor that courts rely on in determining whether undue experimentation is required
60
to practice the invention.

A. Breadth of the Claims and the State of the PriorArt
While the breadth of the claims is listed as a separate factor, patent
examiners and courts usually balance this factor against the other Wands factors,
62
61
such as the presence or absence of working examples or the state of the prior art.
To determine the breadth of the claims, one follows the traditional rules of claim
construction, considering: (1) the plain meaning of the claim language; (2) how claim
63
terms are defined in the patent; and (3) the prosecution history of the patent.
Few decisions have specifically addressed the state of the prior art as a
significant factor. One of the few decisions to even mention this factor, simply stated
that if a disclosure uses prior art materials or processes or something similar to prior
59 See supra notes 5, 6, and 9 (giving examples of combinatorial chemical patents).
6o See Wands, at 736-37 (discussing that the predictability of the art is one of the primary
factors that courts use in determining whether undue experimentation would be required in order to
practice an invention).
61 See Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1418, 1433 (D.Ariz. 1998) (finding
that the inclusion of twenty-eight examples enabled the full breadth of the claims).
62 See id. (finding that the use of prior art materials lessened what the patent needed to teach
to enable the full breadth of the claims).
6 Pickholtz v. Rainbow Techs, Inc., 284 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Only if doubt
remains as to the meaning of a disputed claim term should "extrinsic" evidence, such as an
inventor's testimony and the usage of particular terms in the art, be considered to resolve any
ambiguities created by the patent specification, the claims and the prosecution history. Id. at 1372
73. If a patentee has not clearly disclosed a special meaning for a term in a claim, its ordinary and
common meaning is applied. Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). Claims should be so construed, if possible, so as to sustain their validity. ACS Hosp.
Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). While a patent examiner does
not have a post-issuance prosecution history like the public, an examiner does have the applicant's
representation of their invention from the applicant's arguments.
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art materials or processes, then this decreases what the patent needs to teach to
correlate with the breadth of claims to meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.64
Because combinatorial chemical processes have become increasingly established and
use many of the prior art starting compounds and reagents as traditional chemistry,
a more explicit disclosure would not appear to be required for combinatorial chemical
patents when examining this factor alone.

B. The Relative Skill of Those in the Art and the Quantity ofExperimentation
Necessary
Other factors, such as the relative skill of those in the art and the quantity of
experimentation necessary, weigh more prominently in the analysis. There is
significant latitude in defining the relative skill of those in the art. Courts have
65
generally found that the relative skill is that of a person of ordinary skill in the art.
The relative skill of those in the chemical arts has been established by the United
66
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) as quite "high,"
which increases the quantity of experimentation, the next Wands factor, that may be
67
considered reasonable irrespective of whether this experimentation is automated.
The

quantity

of experimentation

can be

"considerable,"

68

"tedious,"

69

70
"laborious,"
and "time-consuming,171 as long as the experiments are merely
"routine." 72 For example, experimentation requiring only routine optimization or

(4 Durel, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433; see also In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(discussing that the amount of disclosure needed to provide enablement is inversely related to the
amount of knowledge in the state of the art). From this one might infer that, at the very least, a
patent specification does not need to teach what is already taught in the prior art.
65 Typically this is a person with a college degree and some additional experience in a
particular field of research. Durel, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433-34 (finding that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would be "a junior faculty member with one or two years of relevant experience or a
postdoctoral student with several years of experience"). See also Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1374. This is
done for practical reasons as the Court bases its determinations of skill on the background of the
witnesses who may testify at trial, namely the people who conducted most of the research. [d. at
1373.
GGDurel, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433-34. This is relevant only to the extent that a highly skilled
artisan is not required to be an expert in every specialized field to which the invention pertains. See
also Enzo 188 F.3d at 1373 (finding that the high level of skill in the art possessed by a postgraduate researcher does not require accounting for all of the specialized fields to which the
invention pertains, and that they could hardly be characterized as mere laboratory technicians).
67See Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1367; Durel, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433-34.
(3 Ex parte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (B.P.A.I. 1982) ('[t]he test is not merely

quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if it is merely
routine.").
(3 See Exparte Erlich 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011 (B.P.A.I. 1982) (observing that although a method
might be 'tedious and laborious,' such experimentation is nevertheless 'routine').
7o Id.
71 U.S. v. Telectronics Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that the time and
expense of the experimentation are only factors to be considered in assessing enablement and are
not determinative).
72 See Erlieh 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1011 (defining "routine" experiments as those which use known
methods in combination with the variables taught in the patent to achieve the expected, specific,
patented result). This is the case even if certain terms may be vague. See Locklin v. Switzer Bros.,
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screening has not been held to be undue experimentation.7 3 The ability to automate
experiments in a particular field would seem to reduce a patentee's duty of
disclosure, as the primary purpose of automating most processes is to make
repetitious work less tedious and laborious and more routine. To determine if
experimentation is merely routine, courts have turned their analyses to other Wands
factors such as whether (1) the direction, guidance, or working examples disclosed in
the patent teach (2) one of ordinary skill in the art how to choose any (3)
unpredictable aspects presented in the patent to practice (4) the full scope of the
claims. 7 4 The use of the quantity of experimentation factor is troubling on two
counts: (1) it can be completely defined by other Wands factors and therefore seems
unnecessary; and (2) it reduces the requirements of disclosure for patents that
involve automated experimental techniques, irrespective of the nature of those
experiments.

C. The Amount of GuidancePresentedand the Presenceor Absence of Working
Examples
Courts sometimes have trouble distinguishing between what is direction or
guidance and what is a working example. While some courts have equated direction
or guidance with the presence or absence of working examples, 75 other courts have
looked at direction or guidance as any other suggestions, recommendations, or
descriptions that are provided in the specification, especially as to how these
suggestions teach one to choose any unpredictable variables that are involved in the
invention.76

With regard to the presence of working examples, the actual number of
examples is not determinative as zero, one, two, or more examples of a broad genus

Inc., 299 F.2d 160, 166 (9th Cir. 1961) (finding that the phrase "sufficient melamine to render the
resin substantially insoluble" provided a sufficient test of the limits for an ordinary chemist to
perform without extensive experimentation). See also Durel,52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1435 (finding that a
patent that states that a certain variable "may readily be determined through trial and error" may
still be enabled).
3 See, e.g., Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-37 (stating that "[e]nablement is not precluded by the
necessity for some experimentation such as routine screening"). See Lockin, 299 F.2d at 166
(finding that some preliminary testing is required does not render a claim invalid); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Cellpro, 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (differentiating between the shortcomings of a
disclosure and the shortcomings of certain technology by finding that repeating experiments to
obtain success is not undue experimentation).
7 See Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1372-73 (finding that three examples of genes regulated in E. coil did
not provide sufficient guidance to as to how to practice the invention with other genes or in other
cells).
75 See Plant Genetic Sys. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 246, 265 (D.Conn. 2001)
(finding that a patent provided little guidance when it provided only one example of one method to
transform one type of plant and therefore did not enable others to transform all types of plants as
was in the full scope of the claims).
76 See Dure, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433 (noting that the patents at issue did not describe the
particular variables that had to be adjusted but did indicate that a ratio may need to be adjusted
depending upon the precursors used).
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may or may not prove to be enabling.77 In the academic combinatorial chemical
literature, journal editors have tried to be more quantitative in their requirements of
working examples to establish enablement.
For example, the Journal of
Combinatorial Chemistry requires that 5% of the compounds in a library be fully
characterized for the library and its method of production to be considered enabled
for fellow chemists. 7 8 Publishers have implemented this requirement because they
recognize the unpredictability of chemical reactions. 79 With patents, the problem is
whether a specification that sets forth any specific number of examples can be
80
enabling of broad claims when the subject matter is considered to be unpredictable.
This is the case for both traditional and combinatorial chemistry. As developed in
the next section, it is this factor of predictability that is really at the crux of
determining what is reasonable experimentation for combinatorial chemistry

applications.

D.

The Predictability(or Unpredictability)of the Art and the Nature of the Invention

While the mechanical and electrical arts are generally viewed as
"predictable,"8 1 chemical reactions are often considered to be "unpredictable"8 2 both
by chemists8 3 and by the courts.8 4 It is unclear how courts would rule on automated
77 Compare Goodman, 11 F.3d at 1050-52 (holding that a patent was not enabled where the
specification listed only one example of production); Plant Genetic Sys., 175 F.Supp.2d at 265
(holding that one example of one method to transform one type of plant was not enabling for
transforming all plants); Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1374 (finding that three examples of genes regulated in
E. coli did not provide sufficient guidance as to how to practice the invention with other genes or in
other cells) with Johns Hopkins Univ., 152 F.3d at 1342 (holding that a single example of a method
for production was enabling); Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a
single example of a method for production was enabling); and Shanks v. Scheffer, 204 U.S.P.Q.2d
1880 (B.P.A.I. 1979) (holding that while the applicant did not show a single working example, this
was not the ultimate test).
78 See Terret, supra note 11.
79 Id.
In fact, it is these more unpredictable areas that are the most prevalent areas of
patentable research, because scientists and technologists don't fully understand the rules and must
spend a significant amount of effort in trying to solve, predict, and exploit them.
80 See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 7.03[4].
81 Fisher 427 F.2d at 839 (observing that in cases involving predictable factors, such as
mechanical or electrical elements, a single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense
that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance
characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws).
82 In addition to chemistry, some areas of biotechnology have also been determined as
unpredictable, including genetic engineering of plants. Plant Genetic Sys., 175 F. Supp. 2d at 246
(demonstrating that plant transformation and antisense in the late 1980's were highly
unpredictable arts).
83 For example, the Journal of Combinatorial Chemistry notes that "[i]t is well-known that
different batches of solid-phase synthesis supports can affect the success of reactions conducted on
them. Manuscripts, supra note 8, at http://pubs.acs.org/instruct/jcchff.pdf. "To date, there is no
rigorous solution to this source of variability, [and] in the combinatorial chemistry field, evidence of
reagent failure in synthetic efforts is often significant, and authors are encouraged to include such
material if they are confident of their findings." Id.
84 Chemical reactions have been deemed as unpredictable.
See Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839
(observing that in cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and
physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously varies with the degree of unpredictability of
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experiments
that utilize
electromechanical
devices
to perform
chemical
experiments. 85 Patent applicants in art areas currently deemed "unpredictable" are
often allowed generic claims encompassing more than the particular species disclosed
in their specification. 86 Further complicating matters, courts have also recognized
that in view of the rapid advances in science, what may be unpredictable at one point
in time may become predictable at a later time, although the decisions provide no
87
real guidance as to how this is determined.
A more useful factor is the nature of the invention. In contrast to the
predictability of the art, courts have sometimes characterized this factor as the
predictability of the invention.8 8 For example, the Dure] court noted that patents
that deal with chemistry often contain a number of variables, the adjustment of
which may create wide-ranging results.
With such patents, any additional
experimentation is not undue unless there is corresponding uncertainty
accompanying the variables. 89 A showing that a person of ordinary or greater skill in
the art cannot choose among the variables taught by the invention to successfully
reproduce the full scope of the claims is one method to establish unpredictability and
that a patent fails to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112's enabling requirement. 90 However, it is

the factors involved). However, "[t]he mere presence in a chemical reaction of numerous variables is
not enough to created a heightened requirement of disclosure to satisfy the enablement
requirements of § 112."
Id.
A chemical reaction is not per se unpredictable; only if the
corresponding adjustment in the variables of the chemical reaction creates unpredictable or
uncertain results will experimentation be considered to be undue. Durel,52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433-35.
85 The use of automation should be largely irrelevant to this factor. While the probability of a
particular result occurring is enhanced when the number of events attempting to achieve this result
is increased, this is different from predictability, where the result occurs with each event. Therefore
it is the nature of the experiment, not the tools used to conduct the experiment, that should
determine predictability.
86 In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
8
7 See Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1374.
88 Soo Duro], 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 143334 (noting that if an adjustment in a variable created
predictable result, there is no adverse impact upon the scope of enablement). However, if an
adjustment in a variable creates unpredictable results, "the scope of enablement must necessarily
require a higher correlation between the patent claims and the art it teaches to meet the
requirements of § 112." Id. See also Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1214 (noting that the structural complexity
of the product combined with the number of analogs and the uncertainty as to what utility might be
possessed by these analogs increases the need to identify the various analogs that are within the
scope of the claim, methods for making the analogs, and structural requirements for activity).
89 See Durel,52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433-34.
90 See Plant GonotieSys., 175 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (holding that a person skilled in the art would
have to engage in an undue amount of experimentation because of testimony that inventors could
not practice invention until seven months to years after the filing date of the patent); Dure, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433-34 (holding that a person skilled in the art would not have to engage in an
undue amount of experimentation because there was no evidence which illustrated the impact of
adjusting the variables and the corresponding effect upon the predictability or unpredictability of
the resulting reaction and product); see also Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1373 (finding that the amount of
experimentation required to adapt the practice of antisense from E. coli to cells other than E. coli
was quite high based on the inventor's own and other skilled scientists' failed attempts to control the
expression of other genes or of other cell types using antisense technology following the patent's
disclosure); Johns Hopkins Univ., 152 F.3d at 1360 ("[a] party who wishes to prove that the claims of
a patent are not enabled by means of a failed attempt to make the disclosed invention must show
that the patent's disclosure was followed"); Amgon, 927 F.2d at 1214 (noting that the structural
complexity of the product combined with the number of analogs and the uncertainty as to what
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to show a contesting party's burden to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" 91 that
one of ordinary skill in the art must engage in undue experimentation to reproduce
the teachings found in the patent. 92
This unpredictability-in-hindsight test
essentially requires a person contesting the validity of the patent, to actually perform
all of the relevant experiments to determine whether they will work as described.
Thus, the Wands analysis is troubling on several counts: (1) by being defined by
other Wands factors, some Wands factors are completely unnecessary; (2) automating
of experiments would seem to reduce the requirements of disclosure, irrespective of
the nature of those experiments; and (3) the complex interrelationships and overall
ambiguity of the Wands analysis impairs putting the public in possession of the
invention by making it too difficult for a chemical researcher or patent practitioner to
determine whether a patent claim is enabled or valid within the scope of its
disclosure.
Perhaps because of the ambiguities of these factors, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) has developed guidelines for its examiners in
applying 35 U.S.C. § 112 for chemical and biotechnical applications. 93 The USPTO
can make a scope of enablement rejection where the specification enables something
within the scope of the claims, but the claims are not limited to that scope. 94 In
addition, if the specification does not enable any subject matter within the scope of
the claims, the USPTO may make a general enablement rejection that the
specification does not teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to make or use the
invention. 95 To evaluate whether the application complies with the enablement
requirement of § 112, the examiner must determine: (1) what each claim covers as a
whole; (2) how the applicant provides support for the claimed invention including
each element and/or step;96 and (3) whether there is sufficient 97 written description to
utility might be possessed by these analogs increases the need to identify the various analogs that
are within the scope of the claim, methods for making the analogs, and structural requirements for
activity).
91 Johns Hopkins Univ., 152 F.3d at 1360.
92 Durm,
52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433-34.
93 See gvenerally DEP'T OF COMMERCE, United States Patent and Trademark Office, "Training
Materials for Examining Patent Applications with Respect to 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 - Enablement
Chemical/Biotechnical Applications," available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oppd/
lpecba.htm (last modified Nov. 5, 1996).
9
4 d.;
see also MPEP, supra note 7, at § 706.03(c).
95 See Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112 "Written
Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1105 (2001).
96 Id. The Guidelines state that such a review "should include a determination of the field of
the invention and the level of skill in the art at the time the application was filed." Id. The
Guidelines note that "there is an inverse correlation between the level of skill and knowledge in the
art and the specificity of disclosure necessary to satisfy the written description requirement." Id.
Also see generally DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Patent and Trademark Office, "Request for Comments on
Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 "Written
Description" Requirement; Extension of Comment Period and Notice of Hearing, 63 Fed. Reg. 50887,
50888 (Sept. 1, 1998). However, some comments objected to the use of predictability in the written
description requirement because it is an inquiry that should only be associated with the enablement.
Soe Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112 1
"Written Description" Requirement, 64 Fed. Reg. 71427, 71430 (Dec. 21, 1999).
97 Soe Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112
1
"Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1105-06.
The Guidelines state that the
sufficiency requirement may be satisfied with a "representative number of species." What
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inform a skilled artisan that the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus at
the time the application was filed. 98 While these guidelines are simpler, they utilize
the same Wands definitions and provide little guidance to a chemical researcher.
Like an inventor contesting a patent's validity, the USPTO bears the initial burden of
establishing the insufficiency of a disclosure that necessitates undue
experimentation. 99
In the example of Steam Drill's patent, the public, rather than the applicant,
bears the burden of an inventor's broad claim, false prophecy, and reduced burden of
disclosure, which is surely an unsatisfactory result. 100 While a core goal of the
United States patent system is to provide an economic incentive for technological
advancement and investment in scientific research, 10 1 overly broad patents deter
10 2
innovation in a field.
In the next Part, this Comment argues that the reasonable experimentation
10 3
doctrine should be modified. This Comment further proposes a "product by process"
claiming requirement that, while providing a more difficult standard for validity or

constitutes a "representative number" is an inverse function of the skill and knowledge of the art.
Id. at 1106. The first set of Interim Guidelines also stated this relationship as function of the
"predictability in the art."
98Id. at 1105.
99 See In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that the PTO bears the initial
burden of proving that a specification is insufficient, nonenabling, and requires undue
experimentation).
100 The problem with this approach is that most scientists and patent examiners must presume
that claims contained within an issued patent are enabled and should have issued, unless there is a
particular reason to doubt this fact for the library or set of compounds in question. See In re Fisher,
427 F.2d at 839. Thus, under existing law, the resulting published disclosure and patent, if the
claims are allowed, discourages other groups from further investigating the compounds. This is the
case for John Henry's anti-viral compound. Id. Even if John Henry discovers that his anti-viral
compound is not readily made under the conditions described, under these hypothetical facts, the
patentee may still be entitled to enforce his or her claims. For another research group to get a
patent or escape liability for infringement if using a compound of the patent, the research group
must overcome the statutory presumption of validity. Id. To do this they must persuade the fact
finder, perhaps a lay jury, by clear and convincing evidence that the claim is not enabled. Id. Given
the ease with which compounds are characterized using automated techniques and the high
standard of proof, the defendant may not succeed. For a further discussion of aspects of patent
infringement, see generally CHISUM, supra note 16, at §§ 16, 17[5].
101See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1024.
102 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics ofPatentScope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884-908 (1990) (arguing that the breadth of a patent influences its economic
significance; more specifically, that there is less incentive to develop improvements when they are
subject to a blocking patent and the patent holder has less incentive to develop improvements,
knowing that it will retain its rights even if another develops them); Janice M. Mueller, No
"Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 66 (2001) (arguing that transaction costs have
become prohibitive on patents on research tools).
103 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (allowing an inventor to receive a patent on "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"). The USPTO views product-by-process
claims as composition of matter claims. Soe MPEP, supra note 7, at § 2113. See infra Part III.C
(discussing "product-by-process" claiming).
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III. REASONABLE EXPERIMENTATION FOR FAIRNESS PURPOSES VERSUS NOTICE TO THE
PUBLIC: MISSING MIDDLE GROUND

A. The Ambiguity and Breadth of the Wands FactorAnalysis Conflicts with the
Intent of the PatentAct and Slows Academic and IndustrialResearch and
Development

This Part contends that the complicated, broad, and ambiguous Wands
treatment of "reasonable experimentation for fairness purposes" versus "notice" as
two polar extremes is no longer supportable. 10 5 This section first discusses some
classical underlying policies of patent law. This section then goes on to show how
these policies support the suggestion that the burgeoning caseload 10 6 and research
environment in chemical and biotechnology research and development calls for a
fundamental rethinking of the reasonable experimentation doctrine's very generous
and ambiguous contours. Then, sections B and C consider possible solutions in: (1) a
more literal reading of enablement in the specification and claims; and (2) productby-process claiming.
The patent system encourages the dissemination of information important to
spurring future technological innovation by awarding inventors temporary
monopolies in exchange for inventors fully disclosing their subject matter to the
public. 10 7 This "exchange-for-secrets" theory of patent law maintains that industrial
1 08
progress will decrease if inventors do not give the public notice of their inventions.
Because automation decreases the traditional time barriers in the making and
testing of new materials, notice1 09 takes on even greater importance to the public.
104 The product in a product-by-process claim is not limited by the process set forth in the
claim. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
However, the process set forth serves as a limitation in determining infringement. Exxon Chem.
Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co.
v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
105 For a discussion of this conflict, see Karen S. Cannady, The Wright EnablingDisclosurefor
Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 461-62 (1994) and Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in
Rapidly DevelopingArts -Biotechnology,70 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 608, 608-09 (1998).
106 See generally DEP'T OF COMMERCE, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
"Information Technology Standards and Guidelines Program - Economic Analysis," available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/cio/tsg/tsg-ea.pdf (last modified Oct. 1, 1998) (noting that the
USPTO has been facing a ten to fifteen percent yearly increase in its caseload).
107 See Eisenberg, supranote 12, at 1024.
108 See Merges, supra note 102, at 884-908.
109 The concept of notice has always been a prominent feature of the United States patent
system. For example, Justice Story invoked disclosure requirements in an early case where he
stated:
It is therefore argued, that if the specification be materially defective, or obscurely
or so loosely worded, that a skillful workman in that particular art could not
construct the machine, it is a good defense against the action, although no
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With the increasing number of patents issued that have claimed libraries110
and the use of combinatorial chemistry techniques,1 1 combined with the broad
rights 11 2 conferred by the patents using these tools, there is a concomitant decrease
in access to marketable intellectual property space.11 3 While chemical species within
1 14
a prior art teaching of a broad genus are sometimes separately patentable,

intentional deception has been practiced. And this is beyond all question the
doctrine of the common law; and it is founded in good reason; for the monopoly is
granted upon the express condition, that the party shall make a full and explicit
disclosure, so as to enable the public, at the expiration of his patent, to make and
use the invention or improvement in as ample and beneficial a manner as the
patentee himself. If therefore it be so obscure, loose, and imperfect, that this
cannot be done, it is defrauding the public of all the consideration, upon which the
monopoly is granted. (Citation omitted). And, the motive of the party, whether
innocent or otherwise, becomes immaterial because the public mischief remains
the same.
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1122 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). In addition the concept of notice is
a prominent feature of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") compliant
patent systems. Article 29(1) of the TRIPs component of the GATT agreement provides that:
"Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art."
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994). The preeminence of
enablement has been plainly apparent in recent international negotiations. For example, Article
3(1) of the proposed Patent Law Treaty would have incorporated an enablement standard: "[t]he
application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention
to be carried out by a person skilled in the art." Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property as Far as Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Treaty).
WIPO Doc. PLT/DC3 (Dec. 21, 1990), reprintedin Symposium: The Harmonization of International
PatentLaw,26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 669-703 (1993).
110 It is also unclear how courts will handle compounds disclosed in "libraries" which are
defined by selected compounds, physical properties, or procedures. While Courts have yet to
thoroughly examine the scope of "library" claims, they were recently addressed. See Morphosys AG
v. Cambridge Antibody Tech. Ltd., 158 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.C. 2001) (ruling on the motions in an
infringement suit concerning whether claims to methods of obtaining antibodies to specific human
self antigens using particular phage display libraries encompassed the isolation of only "natural"
antibodies or also encompassed the isolation of "synthetic" antibodies).
111 While there were only 5 patents relating to expanding molecular diversity in the years
1980-1988, there were 3 in 1989 and 1990, 17 in 1991 and 1992, 30 in 1993, 34 in 1994, 44 in 1995,
29 in 1996, 88 in 1997, 124 in 1998, 202 in 1999, and 130 in 2000. M. Lebl & Z. Leblova, Dynamic
DatabaseofReferences in MolecularDiversity,athttp://www.5z.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2002).
112 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1999) ("[E]very patent shall contain ...
a grant to
the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States"); see also
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) ("[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.").
113 This has already become a problem in the field of biotechnology. See John H. Barton,
Patents and Antitrust.*A Rethinking In Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65
ANTITRUST L. J. 449, 451 (1997) (discussing how a patent on a biological receptor useful in
schizophrenia could prevent others from research in schizophrenia).
114 For example, the Federal Circuit held that a generic formula that contained a large number
of variables, estimated at more than 100 million compounds, did not suggest that one should select a
particular set of variables that described a particular compound and could not be used as an
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subsequent inventors, nevertheless, must sustain large transaction costs. 115 This
restriction of intellectual space increases costs either through royalty obligations,
heightened legal cost, or other transaction costs associated with acquiring the right
to each new patent. These costs may be so high as to impede, postpone, or stop the
development of important new products critical to the public. 116 The possibility that
research will be delayed or foregone, or that it will be conducted without
authorization and lead to subsequent litigation, is much greater where intellectual
117
property space is limited.
This dilemma of decreased competition when automated experimental
technology is used suggests the importance of (1) re-conceptualizing the reasonable
experimentation doctrine, as well as (2) requiring claims that are more
commensurate in scope with their disclosures as a partial, if not complete, solution.
Each of these solutions will be discussed in the next sections.

IV. INCREASING COMPETITION BY MODIFYING THE REASONABLE EXPERIMENTATION
DOCTRINE AND DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ENABLEMENT

A. Proposalfor Modification of the ReasonableExperimentation Doctrine
One possible solution is for the USPTO and the courts to reduce the
complexity and ambiguity of the Wands factors to a more manageable rule. A
preferable two-part rule would involve (1) identifying the variables that are involved
in the invention, and (2) determining whether the patent teaches a person of
ordinary skill in the art, through examples, guidance, or suggestions, how to choose
those variables to predictably result in practicing the entire scope of the claims. The
rationale for this proposal is that: (1) it is consistent with previous judicial analyses;
and (2) it is easier to implement and simpler for researchers, patent draftspersons,
examiners, and other persons of ordinary skill in the art to understand the true scope

obviousness reference against a claim to that particular compound. In re Baird 16 F.3d 380, 383
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
115 See Merges, supra note 102, at 884-908.
116 The problem of too many broad patents resulting in an impoverishment of intellectual
property space is the same as the famous "tragedy of the commons" theorized by Garrett Hardin in
1968. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SC., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243-48. In Hardin's
metaphor, the absence of restrictions on access to public lands resulted in a tragedy of over-grazing.
Id. at 1244. Here the result is the issuing of overly broad patent claims resulting in the underdevelopment of potentially important products such as commercial drugs or other therapeutic
products. Id.; see also Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CeliPro; An Illustration That Patenting and
Exclusive Licensing of FundamentalScience is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HARV. J. LAW
& TECH. 375 (2000) (discussing transaction costs in greater detail).
117 Because industrial research tends to focus on short-term projects that can lead to
proprietary, marketable products and avoids infringing subject matter, the reasonable
experimentation doctrine as currently interpreted actually works against the prompt introduction of
new products into the market place by restricting areas of research. Id.; see generally Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1053-55
(1997) (describing the significant transaction costs involved in licensing intellectual property).
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of the patent. With the intellectual property field becoming more congested, it is
especially important that practitioners simply look at a patent's claims and their
accompanying disclosure to determine whether the patent is enabled and valid
without much further analysis. This solution does not require one to examine such
factors as the state of the art or the quantity of experimentation necessary that are
too subjective. This solution also has the advantage in that it places some of the
burden back on the patentees to prove that they have an enabling disclosure.
Some might argue that such a proposal would require that the specification
must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention without any
experimentation, rather than just undue experimentation. 118 However, if patents are
truly a form of public contract, this solution is more in compliance with traditional
contract law, where the burden is on the draftsman 1 9 and not the public1 20 to clearly
establish the scope of the contract. Limiting the scope of these "equitable" doctrines
also seems to reflect the more modern approach adopted by the both the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court. 121 By providing more well-defined limits on the
scope or validity of a patent, the USPTO and the courts would create stronger
patents and provide subsequent inventors with sufficient notice to make wellreasoned analyses on how to advance a particular field without incurring either
unnecessary costs or being unnecessarily restricted from exploring areas for both
their and the public's good.
Based on this new rule, the USPTO could require that to meet the
enablement requirement for a compound or a library, an inventor must either (1)
provide sufficient characterization, or (2) establish prior art practices such that an
independent researcher can determine if the compound was made or makeable and
had some utility. As discussed previously, this is consistent with ACS guidelines and
would make obvious whether undue experimentation was necessary to either make
or use the compound. It also assures that the patentee has at least partially
presented how the compound in question may be used. In this manner, the
requirement would truly put both the inventor and the public in possession of the
compound.

1IS See Cannady, supra note 105, at 461-62; see also Winner, supranote 105, at 608-09.
11) See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) ('[I]n choosing among the

reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing

otherwise proceeds."). The rationale behind this rule is that a party who chooses the terms of a
contract is more likely to protect his own interests than those of the other party, in this case the
public. Id.
120 See id. at § 207 ("[I]n choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.").
121 See Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1831 (reaffirming the doctrine of equivalents but limiting it to
where the patentee can rebut that "at the time of the amendment, one skilled in the art could not
have reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the
alleged equivalent").
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B. ProposalRequiringHeightenedDisclosure Requirements andRestricted Claiming
for Patents That Claim Compounds or Libraries
If sufficient experimental information or prior art is not provided by an
applicant, then the USPTO should require that the prophetic chemical compound or
library in question be claimed in a product-by-process claim.

122

Product-by-process

claims describe the patented compound by describing the process envisioned to make
it. While product-by-process claims have traditionally been used only when the
structure of the product is unknown or difficult to determine, 123 the use of such
claims is not limited to this situation. These types of claims protect inventors from
the unauthorized use of their invention if the process results in the patented
compound or composition of matter. 124 However, it will not protect the inventor if the
process fails for the compound(s) of interest. 125 Requiring prophetic products to be
described by the method of their production inherently recognizes the relationship
between the process and the product (i.e., that the process is expected to produce the
product) in unpredictable arts. An advantage of this solution is that an inventor can
specifically obtain protection against use of the compound without unduly limiting
the public from future research in the area. Based on these suggestions, the USPTO
should not grant broad patent protection that encompasses whole chemical areas
based on the characterization of only a few compounds within that area.

CONCLUSION

The current overbroad and ambiguous interpretation of the reasonable
experimentation doctrine in United States patent jurisprudence creates uncertainty
as to who is entitled to do research or commercialize a particular area. This problem
is exacerbated now that many experiments are automated but is the same whether
John Henry mans a hammer or a steam drill. As a result, a large amount of
intellectual property space essentially becomes unavailable both to researchers and
122

See MPEP,supra note 7, at § 2113. The MPEP requires that the product itself meet the

requirements of patentability. Id. (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process,
determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product
does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim
is the same as or obvious form a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even
though the prior product was made by a different process.
Id.
123 See CHISUM, supranote 16, at § 8.05.
124 See Seri ps Clinic, 927 F.2d at 1583 (holding that the validity of product-by-process claims
are limited by the method by which the product is made). However, the product-by-process claims, if
valid, are not limited by the method by which the product is made. It is the product, not the process
by which it is made that determines the scope of the claim. Id. Thus, if the compound is made by
the process disclosed in the patent, an alleged infringer can be held liable for infringement. For a
discussion of infringement, see generallyCHISUM, supra note 16, at §§ 16, 17[5], and Alfonso Garcia
Chan, A Proposed Defense to Patent Infringement, 1999 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 79 (1999)
(discussing infringement in greater detail).
125 Seripps Clinic, 927 F.2d at 1583. Thus, the product-by-process claims will protect the
inventor from the unauthorized use of his invention only if the method results in the patented
compound. Id.
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inventors in a particular research area and to the public who benefit from their
worth. A potential solution is to simplify the reasonable experimentation doctrine
and to require "product by process" claiming for more prophetic compositions of
matter. This allows for a more literal interpretation of enablement, which provides
an easier standard for review. In addition, it provides the patent applicant or owner
protection that is commensurate with the actual scope of the claims and that
provides a better approximation of the true worth of the research to the public. At
the same time, it ensures a standard of validity commensurate with maintaining
incentives for the continued research, development, and patenting of new
compositions of matter in two important areas. By alleviating the access restrictions,
up-front costs, and risks currently associated with working in a patented area, as
well as providing adequate notice to the public, this solution better serves the
original intent of the patent system.
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